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Abstract
How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, affect the deliberation
of monetary policymakers? We exploit a natural experiment in the Federal Open
Market Committee in 1993 together with computational linguistic models (partic-
ularly Latent Dirichlet Allocation) to measure the effect of increased transparency
on debate. Commentators have hypothesized both a beneficial discipline effect and
a detrimental conformity effect. A difference-in-differences approach inspired by
the career concerns literature uncovers evidence for both effects. However, the net
effect of increased transparency appears to be a more informative deliberation pro-
cess.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study how transparency, a key feature of central bank design, affects the
deliberation of monetary policymakers on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).
In other words, we ask: what are the effects on internal deliberation of greater external
communication? Deliberation takes up the vast majority of the FOMC’s time and is
seen by former members as important for the ultimate decision (see Meyer 2004, for
example), but yet it remains little studied beyond anecdotal accounts. Determining how
monetary policy committees deliberate, and how this depends on central bank design, is
therefore important for understanding monetary policy decision making.1 These issues
have likely become even more important with the growing establishment of financial policy
committees and the potential need to share information across central bank committees
with different objectives.
As table 1 shows, there is heterogeneity across three major central banks in terms of
how detailed are the descriptions of policy meetings that are put on the public record.2
Current ECB president Mario Draghi has said that “It would be wise to have a richer
communication about the rationale behind the decisions that the governing council takes”
(Financial Times 2013). It is unclear, though, whether a central bank wishing to increase
transparency should move to only release minutes, or whether there would be an addi-
tional benefit from disclosing full transcripts, as occurs with FOMC meetings. This is
precisely the question currently facing the Bank of England, which has just announced a
review of its policy to not release transcript information.
Table 1: Information made available by different central banks
Federal Reserve Bank of England European Central Bank
Release Minutes? X X X
Release Transcripts? X X X
What is the optimal disclosure policy? Policymakers and academics have identified
potential positive and negative effects of an increase in how much information about the
internal workings of a central bank is revealed to the public.
On the positive side, there is a broad argument that transparency increases the ac-
countability of policymakers, and induces them to work harder and behave better. This
argument has been explicitly applied to central banking (Transparency International
1Of course, policy makers’ decisions remain an output of interest, and a growing complementary
literature takes observed policy choices in both experimental (e.g. Blinder and Morgan 2005, Lombardelli,
Proudman, and Talbot 2005) and actual committees (e.g. Hansen, McMahon, and Velasco 2012) and
uses them to address central bank design questions.
2Minutes of the ECB’s governing council meetings are not published, though the monetary policy
decision is explained at a press conference led by the ECB President after the meeting. The minutes are
supposed to be released eventually after a 30-year lag.
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2012), and even the ECB, the least open of the large central banks, states that: “Facili-
tating public scrutiny of monetary policy actions enhances the incentives for the decision-
making bodies to fulfill their mandates in the best possible manner.”3 This effect is often
labeled as discipline in agency theory and it arises in the Holmstro¨m (1999) career con-
cerns model. The more precise the signal the principal observes about the agent, the
higher the equilibrium effort of the agent.
On the negative side, many observers argue that too much transparency about delib-
eration will stifle committee discussion. In fact, before the Fed had released transcripts,
Alan Greenspan expressed his views to the Senate Banking Committee (our emphasis):
“A considerable amount of free discussion and probing question-
ing by the participants of each other and of key FOMC staff mem-
bers takes place. In the wide-ranging debate, new ideas are often tested,
many of which are rejected ... The prevailing views of many participants
change as evidence and insights emerge. This process has proven to be
a very effective procedure for gaining a consensus ... It could not function ef-
fectively if participants had to be concerned that their half-thought-through,
but nonetheless potentially valuable, notions would soon be made public. I
fear in such a situation the public record would be a sterile set
of bland pronouncements scarcely capturing the necessary debates
which are required of monetary policymaking.” Greenspan (1993), as
reported in Meade and Stasavage (2008).
The view that more transparency may lead to more conformity and hence less infor-
mation revelation is formalized in the career concerns literature. Greater disclosure can
induce experts who are concerned with their professional reputation to pool on actions
that are optimal given available public signals even when their private signals would sug-
gest that other actions are optimal (Prat 2005). In such circumstances, the principal
benefits from committing to a policy of limited transparency.4
Of course, it is possible that both effects—discipline and conformity—operate simul-
taneously, in which case one should ask whether on balance more disclosure improves or
worsens information aggregation. We are able to explore these issues by exploiting the
natural experiment that led to the release of the FOMC transcripts. Since the 1970s,
FOMC meetings were tape recorded to help prepare minutes. Unknown to commit-
tee members, though, these tapes were transcribed and stored in archives before being
3From http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/transparency/html/index.en.html.
4Conformity arises when agents wish to signal expertise. Another potential cost of transparency is
that policymakers may start pandering to their local constituencies in order to signal their preferences.
While this may be a concern for the ECB, in the US there is much less regional heterogeneity than in
the euro area. In any case, models of preference signalling do not make any clear predictions about the
communication measures we study in this paper.
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recorded over. They only learned this when Greenspan, under pressure from the US
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Senate Banking Committee
hereafter), discovered and revealed their existence to the politicians and the rest of the
FOMC.5 To avoid accusations of hiding information, and to relieve potential pressure
to release information in a more timely fashion, the Fed quickly agreed to publish the
past transcripts and all future transcripts with a five-year lag. We thus have a complete
record of deliberation both when policymakers did not know that their verbatim discus-
sions were being kept on file let alone that such information would be made public (prior
to November 1993), and when they knew with certainty that their discussions would
eventually be made public.
Meade and Stasavage (2008) have previously used this natural experiment to analyze
the effect of transparency on members’ incentives to dissent in voice. This dissent data,
recorded in Meade (2005), is a binary measure based on whether a policymaker voiced
disagreement with Chairman Greenspan’s policy proposal during the policy debate. Their
main finding, which they interpret as conformity, is that the probability that members
dissent declines significantly after transparency. We instead generate communication
measures based on basic text counts and on topic models, a class of machine learning
algorithms for natural language processing that estimates what fraction of time each
speaker in each section of each meeting spends on a variety of topics.
This approach allows one to construct several measures of communication relating to
both discipline and conformity, and also to compare which effect is stronger. The wealth
of data also allows us to extend Meade and Stasavage (2008) in another direction. Rather
than compare changes before and after transparency, we also use a difference-in-differences
approach to pin down the precise effect of career concerns. Since career concerns models
predict that reputational concerns decline with labor market experience, we estimate the
differential effect of transparency on FOMC members with less experience in the Fed.
5The issue came to a head in October 1993, between the September and November scheduled FOMC
meetings, when there were two meetings of the Senate Banking Committee to discuss transparency
with Greenspan and other FOMC members. In preparation for the second of these meetings, during
an FOMC conference call on October 15 1993, most of the FOMC members discovered the issue of the
written copies of meeting deliberation. As President Keehn says in the record of this meeting (Federal
Open Market Committee 1993): “Until 10 minutes ago I had no awareness that we did have these detailed
transcripts.” President Boehne, a long-standing member of the committee, added: “...to the very best of
my recollection I don’t believe that Chairman Burns or his successors ever indicated to the Committee as
a group that these written transcripts were being kept. What Chairman Burns did indicate at the time
when the Memorandum was discontinued was that the meeting was being recorded and the recording
was done for the purpose of preparing what we now call the minutes but that it would be recorded over
at subsequent meetings. So there was never any indication that there would be a permanent, written
record of a transcript nature.” He then added “So I think most people in the subsequent years proceeded
on that notion that there was not a written transcript in existence. And I suspect that many people on
this conference call may have acquired this knowledge at about the same time that Si Keehn did.”
Schonhardt-Bailey (2013) contains more contemporary recollections by FOMC members about the release
of transcripts.
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We find evidence of both discipline and conformity. FOMC meetings have two major
parts related to the monetary policy decision, the economic situation discussion (which
we label FOMC1) followed by the policy debate (FOMC2). After transparency, more
inexperienced members come into the meeting and discuss a broader range of topics
during FOMC1 and, while doing so, use significantly more references to quantitative
data and staff briefing material. This indicates greater information acquisition between
meetings, i.e. discipline. On the other hand, after transparency they disengage more
with debate during FOMC2: they are less likely to make interjections, ask less questions,
and stick to a narrow range of topics. They also speak more like Chairman Greenspan.
Discipline pushes towards an increase in the informativeness of inexperienced mem-
bers’ statements, while conformity pushes towards a decrease. To gauge the overall effect
of transparency, we propose an influence score in the spirit of the PageRank algorithm
in order to measure the strength of these two effects. After transparency, more inexpe-
rienced members become significantly more influential in terms of their colleagues’ topic
coverage, indicating that their statements contain relatively more information after trans-
parency than before. Thus, while we confirm Greenspan’s worries expressed above, the
counteracting force of increased discipline after transparency which he does not mention
appears even stronger. The main conclusion of the paper is that central bank designers
should take seriously the role of transparency in disciplining policymakers.
The primary algorithm we use is Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) introduced by
Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003). LDA is widely used in linguistics, computer science, and
other fields and has been cited over 8,000 times in ten years. While topic modelling
approaches are beginning to appear in the social science literature, there use so far is
mainly descriptive. For example, Quinn, Monroe, Colaresi, Crespin, and Radev (2010)
apply a topic model similar to LDA to congressional speeches to identify which members of
Congress speak about which topics. An innovation of our paper is to use communication
measures constructed from LDA output as dependent variables in an econometric model
explicitly motivated by economic theory (more specifically, career concerns). We believe
this illustrates the potential fruitfulness of combining traditional economic tools with
those from the increasingly important world of “Big Data” for empirical research in
economics more broadly.
Fligstein, Brundage, and Schultz (2014)—developed independently6 from this pa-
per—also apply LDA to FOMC transcripts focusing on the period 2000-2007. They
describe the topics that the meeting as a whole covers rather than the topics of indi-
viduals, and verbally argue they are consistent with the sociological theory of “sense-
6The first public draft of Fligstein, Brundage, and Schultz (2014) of which we are aware is from
February 2014. Our paper was developed in 2012 and 2013, with the main results first presented publicly
in September 2013.
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making”. They claim that the standard models that macroeconomists use led them to
fail to connect topics related to housing, financial markets and the macroeconomy. In
contrast, this paper uses LDA applied to all data from the Greenspan era (1987-2006) to
construct numerous measures of communication patterns at the meeting-section-speaker
level and embeds them within a difference-in-differences regression framework to identify
how transparency changes individual incentives.
Bailey and Schonhardt-Bailey (2008) and Schonhardt-Bailey (2013) also use text anal-
ysis to examine the FOMC transcripts. They emphasize the arguments and persuasive
strategies adopted by policymakers (measured using a computer package called “Alceste”)
during three periods of interest (1979-1981, 1991-1993, and 1997-1999). Of course, many
others have analyzed the transcripts without using computer algorithms; for example,
Romer and Romer (2004) use the transcripts to derive a narrative-based measure of
monetary policy shocks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the career concerns literature that
motivates the empirical analysis, and section 3 describes the institutional setting of the
FOMC. Section 4 lays out the econometric models used to study transparency. Section 5
then describes how we measure communication, while section 6 presents the main results
on how transparency changes these measures. Section 7 examines the overall effect of
transparency on behavior. Section 8 explores the effect of transparency on policy, and
section 9 concludes.
2 Transparency and Career Concerns
Since agreeing to release transcripts in 1993, the Fed has done so with a five-year lag. The
main channel through which one expects transparency to operate at this time horizon is
career concerns rather than, for example, communication with financial markets to shift
expectations about future policy. By career concerns, we mean that the long-term payoffs
of FOMC members depend on what people outside the FOMC think of their individual
expertise in monetary policy. This is either because a higher perceived expertise leads
to better employment prospects or because of a purely psychological benefit of being
viewed as an expert in the field. The intended audience may include the broader Fed
community, financial market participants, politicians, etc. A well-developed literature
contains several theoretical predictions on the effects of career concerns, so instead of
constructing a formal model, we summarize how we expect career concerns to operate on
the FOMC and how transparency should modify them.
Discipline The canonical reference in the literature is Holmstro¨m (1999), who shows that
career concerns motivate agents to undertake costly, non-contractible actions (“effort”)
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to improve their productivity. We consider the key dimension of effort exertion on the
FOMC to be the acquisition of information about economic conditions. Members choose
how much time to spend analyzing the economy in the weeks between each meeting.
Clearly gathering and studying data incurs a higher opportunity cost of time, but also
leads a member to having more information on the economy.
As for transparency, Holmstro¨m (1999) predicts that effort exertion increases as the
noise in observed output decreases. If one interprets transparency as increasing the
precision of observers’ information regarding member productivity, one would expect
transparency to increase incentives to acquire information prior to meetings.7
Conformity/Non-conformity Scharfstein and Stein (1990) show that agents with ca-
reer concerns unsure of their expertise tend to herd on the same action, thereby avoiding
being the only one to take an incorrect decision. Interpreted broadly, such conformity
would appear on the FOMC as any behavior consistent with members seeking to fit in
with the group rather than standing out. On the other hand, models in which agents
know their expertise such as Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Levy (2004) predict the
opposite. There is a reputational value for an agent who knows he has an inaccurate
signal to take unexpected actions in order to appear smart. Ottaviani and Sørensen
(2006) show (see their proposition 6) that the bias toward conformity or exaggeration
depends on how well the agent knows his own type: experts with no self-knowledge
conform to the prior while experts with high self-knowledge may exaggerate their own
information in order to appear more confident. (See also Avery and Chevalier (1999)
for a related insight.)
In general, the effect of transparency is to amplify whatever the effect of career con-
cerns is. When agents do not know their expertise, transparency increases incentives to
conform, as shown by Prat (2005) for a single agent and Visser and Swank (2007) for
committees. On the other hand, Levy (2007) has shown that transparency leads com-
mittee members who know their expertise to take contrarian actions more often. We
will therefore leave as an open question whether transparency leads to more conformity
or less non-conformity on the FOMC, and let data resolve the issue.
Overall, the effect of increased transparency can be positive (through increased disci-
pline) or negative (through increased conformity/non-conformity). In section 7 we return
to examining which effect is stronger in the data.
7Equilibrium effort in period t in the Holmstro¨m model is g′(a∗t ) =
∑∞
s=1 β
s hε
ht+shε
where g is the
(convex) cost of effort, β is the discount factor, ht is the precision on the agent’s type (increasing in t),
and hε is the precision of the agent’s output. Clearly the cross derivative of a
∗
t with respect to hε and
ht is decreasing. So, if one interprets transparency as increasing hε, the discipline effect will be higher
for those earlier in their careers. Gersbach and Hahn (2012) explore this idea specifically for monetary
policy committees.
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3 The FOMC and its Meetings
3.1 FOMC Membership
The FOMC, which meets 8 times per year to formulate monetary policy (by law it must
meet at least 4 times) and to determine other Federal Reserve policies, is composed of 19
members; there are seven Governors of the Federal Reserve Board (in Washington DC)
of whom one is the Chairperson (of both the Board of Governors and the FOMC) and
there are twelve Presidents of Regional Federal Reserve Banks with the President of the
New York Fed as Vice-Chairman of the FOMC.8
The US president nominates members of the Board of Governors who are then subject
to approval by the US Senate. A full term as a Governor is 14 years (with an expiry
at the end of January every even-numbered year), but the term is actually specific to
a seat around the table rather than an individual member so that most Governors join
to serve time remaining on a term. Regional Fed presidents are appointed by their own
bank’s board of nine directors (which is appointed by the Banks in the region (6 of the
members) and the Board of Governors (3 of the members)) and are approved by the
Board of Governors; these members serve 5 year terms.
The main policy variable of the FOMC is a target for the Federal Funds rate (Fed
Funds rate), as well as, potentially, a bias (or tilt) in future policy.9 At any given time,
only twelve of the FOMC have policy voting rights though all attend the meetings and
take part in the discussion. All seven Governors have a vote (though if there is a Governor
vacancy then there is no alternate voting in place); the president of the New York Fed is
a permanent voting member (and if absent, the first vice president of the New York Fed
votes in his/her place); and four of the remaining eleven Fed Presidents vote for one year
on a rotating basis.10
3.2 The Structure of FOMC Meetings
Most FOMC meetings last a single day except for the meetings that precede the Mone-
tary Policy Report for the President which last two days. Before FOMC meetings, the
members receive briefing in advance such as the “Green Book” (staff forecasts), “Blue
8Federal Reserve staff also attend the meeting and provide briefings in it.
9Over time, this has changed quite a bit. Now, the FOMC states whether the risks are greater to price
stability or sustainable growth, or balanced. Between 1983 and December 1999, the FOMC included in
its monetary policy directive to the Open Market Trading Desk of the New York Fed a signal of the likely
direction of future policy. In 2000, these signals were just made more explicit. Moreover, there was never
a clear understanding of why the bias was even included; Meade (2005) points to transcript discussions
in which FOMC members debate the point of the bias, though Thornton and Wheelock (2000) conclude
that it is used most frequently to help build consensus.
10Chicago and Cleveland Fed presidents vote one-year on and one-year off, while the remaining 9
presidents vote for 1 of every 3 years.
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Book” (staff analysis of monetary policy alternatives) and the “Beige Book” (Regional
Fed analysis of economic conditions in each district).
During the meeting there are a number of stages (including 2 discussion stages).
All members participate in both stages regardless of whether they are currently voting
members:11
1. A NY Fed official presents financial and foreign exchange market developments.
2. Staff present the staff economic and financial forecast.
3. Economic Situation Discussion (FOMC1):
 Board of Governors’ staff present the economic situation (including forecast).
 There are a series of questions on the staff presentations.
 FOMC members present their views of the economic outlook. The Chairman
tended to speak reasonably little during this round.
4. In two-day meetings when the FOMC had to formulate long-term targets for money
growth, a discussion of these monetary targets took place in between the economic
and policy discussion rounds.
5. Policy Discussion (FOMC2):
 The Board’s director of monetary affairs then presents a variety of monetary
policy alternatives (without a recommendation).
 Another potential round of questions.
 The Chairman (1st) and the other FOMC discuss their policy preferences.
6. The FOMC votes on the policy decision—FOMC votes are generally unanimous (or
close to) but there is more dissent in the discussion.
The econometric analysis focuses mainly on the part of the meeting relating directly
to the economic situation discussion which we call FOMC1, and the part relating to the
discussion of the monetary policy decision which we call FOMC2. However, we estimate
our topic models for all statements in each meeting in the whole sample.
11See http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed48.html and Chappell, McGregor,
and Vermilyea (2005) for more details.
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3.3 FOMC discussions outside the meeting?
One concern may be that formal FOMC meetings might not be where the FOMC actually
meets to make policy decisions but rather the committee meets informally to make the
main decisions. Thankfully, this is less of a concern on the FOMC than it would poten-
tially be in other central banks. This is because the Government in Sunshine Act, 1976,
aims to ensure that Federal bodies make their decisions in view of the public and requires
them to follow a number of strict rules about disclosure of information, announcement
of meetings, etc. While the FOMC is not obliged to operate under the rules of the Sun-
shine Act, they maintain a position that is as close to consistent with it though with
closed meetings.12 This position suggests that the Committee takes very seriously the
discussion of its business in formal meetings, which accords with what we have been told
by staff and former members of the FOMC, as well as parts of the transcripts devoted
to discussing how to notify the public that members had chosen to start meeting a day
early. As such, we can take as given that the whole FOMC does not meet outside the
meeting to discuss the decision.
4 Empirical strategy
We now discuss the natural experiment that allows us to identify the effect of trans-
parency, the econometric specification within which we embed it, and the data sources
on which we draw.
4.1 Natural experiment
The natural experiment for transparency on the FOMC resulted from both diligent staff
archiving and external political pressure. In terms of the former, for many years prior
to 1993 Fed staff had recorded meetings to assist with the preparation of the minutes.
As highlighted in the FOMC’s own discussions (Federal Open Market Committee 1993,
quoted in the introduction), members believed that the staff would record over the tapes
for subsequent meeting recordings once the minutes were released. While the staff did
record over the older tapes—unknown to FOMC members—they first typed up and
archived a verbatim text of the discussion.
FOMC members, including Chairman Greenspan, were not aware of these archives
until political pressure from Henry B. Gonzalez forced the Fed to discuss how it might be
more transparent, at which point staff revealed them to Greenspan. Shortly thereafter, in
12See http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_SunshineActPolicy.pdf
and http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/sunshine.htm for the Fed’s
official position.
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October 1993, Greenspan acknowledged the transcripts’ existence to the Senate Banking
Committee. Initially Greenspan argued that he didn’t want to release any verbatim
information as it would stifle the discussion. But pressure on the Fed was growing, and
so it quickly moved to release not just the future transcripts (with a five-year lag), but
also to release the previous years’. This means that we have transcripts from prior to
November 1993 in which the discussion took place under the assumption that individual
statements would not be on the public record, and transcripts after November 1993 in
which each policy maker knew that every spoken word would be public within five years.13
4.2 Econometric specification
Since the decision to change transparency was not driven by FOMC concerns about the
nature or style of deliberation, and the change came as a surprise, the most straight-
forward empirical strategy to identify the effects of transparency on deliberation is to
estimate a baseline “diff” regression of the following form:
yt = α + βD(Trans) + λXt + εt, (DIFF)
where yt is the output variable of interest, D(Trans) is a transparency dummy (1 after
November 1993), and Xt is a vector of macro controls for the meeting at time t.
While useful as a descriptive account of behavior before and after transparency, the
“diff” analysis is potentially problematic because the timing of other changes may have
coincided with the change in transparency. As such, the β estimated in (DIFF) may
capture the effects of these other changes, making it impossible to disentangle the different
effects. In order to more clearly attribute the changes one observes to transparency, we
propose a “diff-in-diff” analysis in which we argue that the effects of transparency should
be greatest on those people who have the greatest career concerns.
To measure the extent of career concerns, we take an idea from proposition 1 of Holm-
stro¨m (1999) which argues that the strength of an expert’s career concerns increases in
the uncertainty of the principal’s belief about the expert’s ability. To capture uncertainty
in FOMC members’ ability, we define a variable FedExpi,t that measures the number of
years member i has spent working in the Fed system through meeting t. This includes
both years spent in the Fed before appointment to the FOMC, and years spent on the
13While the majority of members only found out about the existence of the transcripts in October
1993 as a result of the Senate hearings and a series of conference calls by FOMC members related to this
process, some members were aware a bit earlier. Nonetheless, we choose November 1993 as the point at
which the main transparency effects occur; this is the first meeting at which all members were aware of
the transcripts and a decision to release the transcripts with a five-year lag had been put forward. If
the few members that knew of the transcripts before October 1993 started to react to the possibility of
the transcripts becoming public, this would tend to bias our estimates away from finding a change after
November 1993.
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committee.14 The longer a member has served in the Fed, the more time the policymak-
ing community has observed them, and so the less uncertainty there should be about
their expertise in monetary policy. In other words, we expect career concerns to decline
in FedExpi,t. In figure 1a we plot the histogram of this variable across all members in
our main sample period and in figure 1b we plot the individual evolution of this variable
across each member.
The main specification we use in the paper is the following “diff-in-diff” regression:15
yit = αi + δt + βD(Trans)t + ηFedExpi,t + φD(Trans)t × FedExpi,t + it (DinD)
The main coefficient of interest is the φ coefficient on the interaction term. Since career
concerns decline with FedExpi,t, a positive (negative) φ indicates that members with
greater career concerns do less (more) of whatever yi,t is measuring. Given the inclusion
of time and member fixed effects, the identification comes mostly off those members
who served both before and after the change in transparency. For the baseline analysis
presented below, we will focus on a sample that uses the first ten years of Alan Greenspan’s
tenure as chair of the FOMC (1987-1997). In appendix C, we show that results remain
robust to alternative sample selections.
Testing the statistical significance of the φ coefficient requires us to have a well-
estimated variance-covariance matrix. This is particularly a challenge with a fixed-effects
panel data model because the data can be autocorrelated, there may be heteroskedas-
ticity by member, and there may be cross-sectional dependence. All of these reduce the
actual information content of the analysis and may lead us to overstate the significance
of estimated relationships. We use the nonparametric covariance matrix estimator pro-
posed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998). This helps to make our standard errors robust to
general forms of spatial and temporal dependence, as well as being heteroskedasticity-
and autocorrelation-consistent.
4.3 FOMC transcript data
The yit measures in (DinD) are constructed using FOMC meeting transcripts.
16. Apart
from minor redactions relating, for example, to maintaining confidentiality of certain
participants in open market operations, they provide a complete account of every FOMC
meeting from the mid-1970’s onwards. In this paper, we use the set of transcripts from
the tenure of Alan Greenspan—August 1987 through January 2006, inclusive, a total of
14This information came from online sources and the Who’s Who reference guides.
15For the purposes of the analysis, we treat all staff members as a single homogenous group. So, in
meeting t, i indexes all FOMC members plus a single “individual” called staff.
16These are available for download from http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc_
historical.htm
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149 meetings. During this period, the FOMC also engaged in numerous conference calls
for which there are also verbatim accounts, but as many of these were not directly about
about monetary policy we do not use them in our analysis.
The transcripts available from the Fed website need to be cleaned and processed before
they can be used for empirical work. We have ensured the text is appropriately read in
from the pdf files, and have removed non-spoken text such as footnotes, page headers,
and participant lists. There are also several apparent transcription errors relating to
speaker names, which always have an obvious correction. For example, in the July 1993
meeting a “Mr. Kohn” interjects dozens of times, and a “Mr. Koh” interjects once; we
attribute the latter statement to Mr. Kohn. Finally, from July 1997 backwards, staff
presentation materials were not integrated into the main transcript. We took the separate
staff statements from appendices and then matched them into the main transcripts. The
final dataset contains 46,502 unique interjections along with the associated speaker.
While we estimate topic models on the whole meeting, we focus our analysis on
the statements in each meeting that corresponded to the economic situation discussion
(FOMC1) and the policy discussion (FOMC2), as described in section 3. To do this,
we manually coded the different parts of each meeting in the transcript; FOMC1 and
FOMC2 make up around 31% and 26% of the total number of statements.
5 Measuring Communication
A major challenge for the analysis is to convert the raw text in the transcript files into
meaningful quantities for the dependent variables in the regressions described in section
4. The first step in the text processing is to tokenize each statement, or break it into
its constituent linguistics elements: words, numbers and punctuation.17 One can easily
then count the number of occurrences of a given token in each statement. Using such an
approach, we construct three measures of language per statement.
1. Number of questions (count of token ‘?’)
2. Number of sentences (count of tokens ‘?’, ‘!’, and ‘.’)
3. Number of words (count of alpha-numeric tokens; 5,594,280 in total).
From these counts, one can then measure the total number of questions/sentences/words
at various aggregate levels of interest. In addition, we also use the total number of
statements as a fourth count-based measure of communication within meetings.
17For tokenization and some other language processing tasks outlined below, we used the Natural
Language Toolkit developed for Python and described in Bird, Klein, and Loper (2009).
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While the simplicity of count-based analysis is appealing, a basic problem for deter-
mining what FOMC members talk about is what tokens one should count. For example,
one might count the number of times ‘growth’ appears in statements to create an index of
focus on economic activity. But clearly other words are also used to discuss activity, and
knowing which list to choose is not obvious and would involve numerous subjective judge-
ments. Moreover, the word ‘growth’ is also used in other contexts, such as in describing
wage growth as a factor in inflationary pressures. The topic modelling approach addresses
these issues by adopting a flexible statistical structure that groups words together to form
“topics”, and by allowing the same word to appear in multiple topics.
The rest of the section describes our implementation of the LDA model. It first lays
out the underlying statistical model, and then describes how we estimate it. Finally, it
discusses how to transform the output of the estimation into measures of communication.
5.1 Statistical model
Our text dataset is a collection of D documents, where a document d is a list of words
wd = (wd,1, . . . , wd,Nd).
18 In our dataset, a document is a single statement, or interjec-
tion, by a particular member in a particular meeting. For example, we would have two
statements if Alan Greenspan asks a question of staff (the first statement) and a staff
member replies (the second statement).
Let V be the number of unique words across all documents. These words form K
topics, where a topic βk ∈ ∆V is a distribution over these V words. The vth element of
topic k βvk represents the probability of a given word appearing in topic k. In turn, each
document is modeled as a distribution over topics. Documents are independently but not
identically distributed. Let θd ∈ ∆K be the distribution of topics in document d, where
θkd represents the “share” of topic k in document d. In the FOMC context, we imagine
θd as a choice variable of the policymaker that generates document d.
The statistical process that generates the list of words in document d involves two
steps. We dispose of the d subscripts for notational convenience. Imagine a document as
composed of N slots corresponding to the N observed words. In the first step, each slot
is independently allocated a topic assignment zn according to the probability vector θ
corresponding to the distribution over topics in the document. These topic assignments
are unobserved and are therefore latent variables in the model. In the second step, a
word is drawn for the nth slot from the topic βzn that corresponds to the assignment zn.
Given θ and the topics βk for k = 1, . . . , K, the overall probability of observing the list
18Here “word” should more formally be “token” which is not necessarily an English word but rather
should be understood as simply an abstract element.
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of words corresponding to document d is
N∏
n=1
∑
zn
Pr [ zn | θ ] Pr [wn | βzn ] (1)
where the summation is over all possible topic assignments for word wn.
Computations based on (1) are generally intractable, so direct maximum likelihood
approaches are not feasible. Instead, LDA assumes that each θd is drawn from a symmet-
ric Dirichlet(α) prior with K dimensions, and that each βk is drawn from a symmetric
Dirichlet(η) prior with V dimensions. Realizations of Dirichlet distributions with M
dimensions lie in the M -simplex, and the hyperparameters α and η determine the con-
centration of the realizations. The higher they are, the more even the probability mass
spread across the dimensions. Given these prior probabilities, the probability of document
d becomes∫
. . .
∫ K∏
k=1
Pr [ βk | η ] Pr [ θ | α ]
(
N∏
n=1
∑
zn
Pr [ zn | θ ] Pr [wn | βzn ]
)
dθdβ1 . . . dβK (2)
Two assumptions of LDA are worth noting. First, LDA is a bag-of-words model in
which the order of words does not matter, just their frequencies. While this assumption
clearly throws away information, it is a useful simplification when the primary consider-
ation is to measure what topics a document covers. Word order becomes more important
when the goal is sentiment analysis, or how a document treats a topic. Second, documents
are assumed to be independent. LDA can be extended to model various dependencies
across documents.19 Dynamic topic models allow βk to evolve over time.
20 These are par-
ticularly important when documents span many decades. For example, Blei and Lafferty
(2006) study the evolution of scientific topics during the 20th century. In contrast our
sample covers roughly 20 years, and we use a much smaller window to study the effect
of transparency. Author-topic models (Rosen-Zvi, Chemudugunta, Griffiths, Smyth, and
Steyvers 2010) model a document as being generated by it author(s), essentially substi-
tuting authors for documents in the generative statistical model. Since we expect the
same speaker to use different topic distributions across and within meetings, we prefer to
conduct the analysis at the document level.
One reason for the popularity of LDA is its ability to consistently estimate topics that
appear natural despite having no pre-assigned labels. As we show in section 5.4, it indeed
19For a discussion of extensions to LDA, see Blei and Lafferty (2009) or the lectures given by David
Blei at the Machine Learning Summer School in 2009 (Blei 2009).
20A distinct issue is whether the distribution over topics in a particular statement is affected by the
distribution over topics in previous statements. Rather than explicitly building such dependence directly
into the statistical model, we explore it with the influence measure we construct in section 7.
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estimates topics that are close to ones economists would generate. The basic intuition
for how LDA generates topics relates to the co-occurrence of words in documents. As
discussed by Blei (2009), LDA places regularly co-occurring words together into topics
because it tends to spread words across few topics to maximise the word probabilities
for each given topic—i.e. the Pr
[
wd,n
∣∣ βzd,n ] term in (1). Another advantage of LDA
is that it is a mixed membership model that allows the same word to appear in multiple
topics with different probabilities, whereas a standard mixture model would force each
word to appear in just one topic. For example, returning to the example above, the word
“growth” can appear both in a topic about activity (along with words like “gdp”) and
in a topic about labor markets (along with words like wage). This flexibility loosens the
typical definition of co-occurrence and leads to more accurate descriptions of content.
5.2 Estimation
The parameters of interest of the model are the topics βk and document-topic distri-
butions θd. For estimation, we use the Gibbs sampling approach introduced into the
literature by Griffiths and Steyvers (2004) (see also Steyvers and Griffiths 2006). Their
approach directly estimates the posterior distribution over topic assignments (zd,n) given
the observed words. The algorithm begins by randomly assigning topics to words, and
then updating topic assignments by repeatedly sampling from the appropriate posterior
distribution. Full details of the approach are in appendix A.21
As with all Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, the realized value of any one chain
depends on the random starting values. For each specification of the model, we therefore
run 8,000 iterations beginning from 5 different starting values and choose for analysis the
chain that achieves the best fit of the data based on its average post-convergence perplex-
ity, a common measure of fit in the natural language processing literature.22 In practice
the differences in perplexity across chains are marginal, indicating that the estimates are
not especially sensitive to starting values.
5.2.1 Vocabulary selection
Before sampling the model, one must choose which vocabulary will be excluded from
the analysis. The reason for this is to ease the computational burden of estimation by
21For estimation we adapt the C++ code of Phan and Nguyen (2007) available from gibbslda.
sourceforge.net.
22The formula is
exp
−∑Dd=1∑Vv=1Nd,v log
(∑K
k=1 θ̂
k
d β̂
v
k
)
∑D
d=1Nd

where Nd,v is the number of times word v occurs in document d.
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removing words which will not be very informative in the analysis. For each document,
we:
1. Remove all tokens not containing solely alphabetic characters. This strips out
punctuation and numbers.
2. Remove all tokens of length 1. This strips out algebraic symbols, copyright signs,
currency symbols, etc.
3. Convert all tokens to lowercase.
4. Remove stop words, or extremely common words that appear in many documents.
Our list is rather conservative, and contains all English pronouns, auxiliary verbs,
and articles.23
5. Stem the remaining tokens to bring them into a common linguistic root. We use the
default Porter Stemmer implemented in Python’s Natural Language Toolkit. For
example, ‘preferences’, ‘preference’, and ‘prefers’ all become ‘prefer’. The output
of the Porter Stemmer need not be an English word. For example, the stem of
‘inflation’ is ‘inflat’. Hence, the words are now most appropriately called “tokens”.
We then tabulate the frequencies of all two- and three-token sequences in the data,
known as bigrams and trigrams, respectively. For those that occur most frequently and
which have a specific meaning as a sequence, we construct a single token and replace it
for the sequence. For example, ‘fed fund rate’ becomes ‘ffr’ and ‘labor market’ becomes
‘labmkt’. The former example ensures that our analysis does not mix up “fund” when
used as part of the noun describing the main policy instrument and when members discuss
commercial banks’ funding.
Finally, we rank the 13,888 remaining tokens in terms of their contribution to discrim-
inating among documents. The ranking punishes words both when they are infrequent
and when they appear in many documents.24 Plotting the ranking indicates a natural
cutoff we use to select V = 8, 615 words for the topic model. Words below this cutoff are
removed from the dataset.
23The list is available from http://snowball.tartarus.org/algorithms/english/stop.txt. The
removal of length-1 tokens already eliminates the pronoun ‘I’ and article ‘a’. The other length-1 English
word is the exclamation ‘O’. We converted US to ‘United States’ so that it was not stripped out with
the pronoun ‘us’. We also converted contractions into their constituent words (e.g. ‘isn’t’ to ‘is not’).
24More specifically, we computed each word’s term-frequency, inverse-document-frequency—or tf-
idf —score. The formula for token v is
tf-idfv = log [1 + (Nv)]× log
(
D
Dv
)
where Nv is the number of times v appears in the dataset and Dv is the number of documents in which
v appears.
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After this processing, 2,715,586 total tokens remain. Some statements are empty, so
we remove them from the dataset, leaving D = 46, 169 total documents for input into
the Gibbs sampler.
5.2.2 Model selection
There are three parameters of the model that we fix in estimation: the hyperparameters
for the Dirichlet priors α and η and the number of topics K. For values of the hyperpa-
rameters, we follow the general advice of Griffiths and Steyvers (2004) and Steyvers and
Griffiths (2006) and set α = 50/K and η = 0.025. The low value of η promotes sparse
word distributions so that topics tend to feature a limited number of prominent words.
The most common approach to choosing the number of topics is to estimate the model
for different values of K on randomly selected subsets of the data (training documents),
and then to determine the extent to which the estimated topics explain the omitted data
(test documents). This approach shows that a model with several hundred topics best
explains our data. Since our goal is to organize text into easily interpretable categories
rather than to predict the content of FOMC meetings per se, we consider this number
too high.25 We instead estimate models with K = 50 and K = 70, which both allows us
to relatively easily interpret the topics and to explore the effect of altering the number
of topics on the results.26 In the main body of the text, we report results for K = 50.
5.3 Document aggregation
The primary object of interest for the empirical analysis is the proportion of time different
FOMC members spend on different topics and, to a lesser extent, the proportion of time
the committee as a group devotes to different topics. The Gibbs sampler delivers the
estimate θ̂d,j at the jth iteration for the topic proportions in document d along with
estimated topics β̂k,j for k = 1, . . . , K. While considering individual statements is useful
for estimating the LDA model, for estimating (DinD) we are more interested in measures
of the form θ̂i,t.s,j, where i indexes an FOMC member, t indexes a meeting, and s indexes
a meeting section (FOMC1 or FOMC2). We detail how we obtain estimates for aggregate
25According to Blei (2012), interpretability is a legitimate reason for choosing a K different from the
one that performs best in out-of-sample prediction. He notes a “disconnect between how topic models
are evaluated and why we expect topic models to be useful.” In our setting, as the number of topics
increases, the identified topics become increasingly specific. As we show in the next section, a 50 topic
model produces a single topic relating to risk. By contrast, a 200 topic model produces topics on upside
risks, downside risks, risks to growth, financial market risk, etc. Also, as our database is to some extent
conversational, a model with a large K picks out very specific conversational patterns as topics, such as
addressing Chairman Greenspan prior to discussing one’s views on the economy.
26The highest marginal effects of changing the number of topics on out-of-sample prediction values
arise for K < 100.
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documents in appendix A. The basic idea is to hold fixed the estimated topics and re-
sample—or query—the aggregate documents.
We obtain the final estimate θ̂i,t,s by averaging θ̂i,t,s,j over j ∈ {4050, 4100, . . . , 8000}.
Hence, in the language of MCMC estimation, we run 4,000 iterations after a burn-in of
4,000 iterations, and apply a thinning interval of 50. Based on perplexity scores, all the
chains we estimate converge at or before the 4,000th iteration. There are several further
measures of communication we use in section 6 derived from θ̂i,t.s,j. In each case, they
are also computed at each relevant iteration and then averaged.
5.4 Estimated topics
In appendix B we report the top ten tokens in each topic, but here discuss a handful to
give a sense of the kind of content that LDA estimates. LDA is an unsupervised learning
algorithm, and so produces no meaningful topic labels. Any attribution of meaning to
topics requires a subjective judgement on the part of the researcher. Most of the empirical
results depend only on mild such judgements, but it is still important that the topics are
reasonable in the context of macroeconomics.
An obvious place to start is to examine discussion of inflation. A single topic—topic
25—gathers together many of the terms macroeconomists associate with inflation. Figure
2 represents the topic with a word cloud in which the size of the token represents the
probability of its appearing in the topic.27 The dominant token is “inflat” which captures
words relating to inflation, but there are others like “core”, “cpi”, etc. Given recent
events, also of interest is topic 38 (figure 3), which collects together terms relating to
banking and finance more generally. There are also topics on consumption and investment
(figure 4) and productivity (5) which, as we show in section 8, predict policy outcomes.
So far the topics we have displayed relate to obvious economic themes, but there
are also quite a few topics that do not. We call these topics discussion as opposed to
economics topics, and have classified each topic into one of the two categories. This
is the main subjective labeling exercise we use in the analysis. In the 50-topic model
we analyze, there are 30 economics topics and 20 discussion topics. Discussion topics
comprise both topics made up of words that are used in conversation to convey meaning
when talking about economics topics, and some topics which are pure conversational
words. For example, there is a topic which just picks up the use of other members’ names
as well as the voting roll call (figure 6); and the five most likely tokens in topic 49 (figure
7) are ‘say’, ‘know’, ‘someth’, ‘all’, and ‘can’ which can be used in general conversation
regardless of what specific topic is being discussed. But a few of the other discussion
topics may also be informative about the behaviour of FOMC members such as the topic
27The use of a word cloud is purely for illustrative purposes and the clouds play no role in the analysis;
the precise probability distribution over tokens for each topic is available on our websites.
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Figure 2: Topic 25—“Inflation”
Figure 3: Topic 38—“Banking”
Notes: Each word cloud represents the probability distribution of words within a given
topic; the size of the word indicates its probability of occurring within that topic.
20
Figure 4: Topic 23—“Consumption and Investment”
Figure 5: Topic 29—“Productivity”
Notes: Each word cloud represents the probability distribution of words within a given
topic; the size of the word indicates its probability of occurring within that topic.
21
Figure 6: Topic 27—“Discussion topic: FOMC Names”
Figure 7: Topic 49—“Discussion topic: General terms”
Notes: Each word cloud represents the probability distribution of words within a given
topic; the size of the word indicates its probability of occurring within that topic.
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containing terms relating to discussions of data and also one relating to discussions of
staff materials; we return to discussing these topics in more detail in section 6.
5.5 Connecting topics to external events
A common approach for assessing the quality of the output of machine learning algo-
rithms is to validate them against external data. Since we do not rely heavily on specific
topic labels, such an exercise is not crucial for interpreting our results, but for interest we
have explored the relationship of the estimated topics to the recently developed uncer-
tainty index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013) (BBD hereafter). This index picks up the
public’s perceptions of general risk as well as expiring fiscal measures. It is also method-
ologically related to our data in that the primary input for the index is text data from
the media, albeit measured differently (via the number of articles per day that contain a
set of terms the authors select).
Figure 8 displays the estimated topic most associated with fiscal issues, and plots the
amount of time the FOMC as a whole spends on it against the BBD index.28 The rela-
tionship between BBD-measured uncertainty and FOMC attention towards fiscal matters
is quite strong, with both notably spiking during times of war and recession. Figure 9
displays the topic most associated with risk and uncertainty and also plots the atten-
tion it received during FOMC meetings against the BBD index. While the two series
co-move, it is particularly noteworthy that the estimates suggest that in the run-up to
the financial crisis in 2007 the market was not yet concerned with risk while the FOMC
was increasingly discussing it.
Finally, the estimates pick up a topic related to central bank communication that
appears regularly in meetings to capture discussion of statements and previous minutes.
Its associated word cloud is in figure 10a. This topic is useful to check whether the
decision to reveal the transcripts was surprising. As we argue for our natural experiment,
FOMC members only learned of the transcripts in October 1993 and discussed the right
policy to deal with their release at the start of the meeting in November 1993. If it were
indeed a big surprise, one would expect there to be more than usual discussion of issues of
communication. Figure 10b shows that during a typical meeting FOMC members might
spend 2% of their time on this topic, and in an unusual meeting—perhaps discussing
a particularly tricky statement—up to 8% of their time. By contrast, in November
1993 the FOMC spent over 20% of the meeting discussing the issue of transparency and
transcripts being made public. We are therefore comfortable interpreting the publication
of transcripts as a genuine surprise.
28The distributions for the out-of-sample years coinciding with Ben Bernanke taking over as Chairman
are estimated through the querying procedure discussed in appendix A.
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(a) Topic 45—“Fiscal”
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(b) BBD uncertainty and discussion of topic 45
Figure 8: BBD uncertainty measure and FOMC attention to fiscal issues
Notes: The word cloud (top) represents the probability distribution of words within a given
topic. The time-series (bottom) captures the time allocated to that topic in each meeting.
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(a) Topic 40—“Risk”
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(b) BBD uncertainty and discussion of topic 40
Figure 9: BBD uncertainty measure and FOMC attention to risk
Notes: The word cloud (top) represents the probability distribution of words within a given
topic. The time-series (bottom) captures the time allocated to that topic in each meeting.
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(a) Topic 6—“Central Bank Communication”
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(b) Discussion of topic 6 across meetings
Figure 10: FOMC attention to communication: surprised by transparency revelation?
Notes: The word cloud (top) represents the probability distribution of words within a given
topic. The time-series (bottom) captures the time allocated to that topic in each meeting.
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6 Empirical Results
We now present the estimates of the econometric models in section 4 using numerous
measures of communication. The first are derived from the token counts described in
section 5. After documenting how these shifted with transparency, we study how the
content of statements changed using various measures constructed from the LDA model.
6.1 Transparency and basic language counts
We first use token counts to judge whether there were substantive changes in deliberation
after transparency. To begin, we estimate (DIFF) to compare meeting-level aggregates
before and after transparency. The regressions include meeting and other time-specific
controls (but, obviously, no time fixed effects), and are estimated separately on the dis-
cussion of the economic situation (FOMC1) and of policy (FOMC2).
Table 2a shows the change in FOMC1. After transparency, there are more words
delivered in fewer statements, resulting in more words per statement. We interpret the
drop in statements as reflecting a reduction in back-and-forth dialogue, since this would
generate many statements as the debate bounced from member to member. There are
also significantly fewer questions. These simple counts paint a picture of FOMC members
coming to the meeting with longer, more scripted views on the economy, and being
somewhat less likely to question the staff and their colleagues during the discussion.
Table 2b shows the change in FOMC2. While the change in the number of words
and sentences is not statistically significant, there are dramatic effects in the rest of the
measures. The average number of questions and statements both drop by around 35%
and the number of words per statement increases by nearly 40%. This indicates a stark
shift away from a dynamic, flowing discussion towards one in which members share their
views on policy in one long statement, and then disengage from their colleagues.
Since the results in tables 2a and 2b are based on the (DIFF) specification, it is
unclear whether one can attribute the observed changes to career concerns or to some
other factor that shifted near November 1993. To link the results to career concerns,
we estimate (DinD) to examine which changes are more pronounced for members with
less experience in the Fed. The results are in table 3 (which presents the results for
FOMC1 and FOMC2 in a single table but covers a reduced number of variables). The
key coefficient is that estimated for the interaction term between the transparency dummy
and the Fed experience variable. Recall that since career concerns decline with experience,
the direction of the effect of career concerns is opposite in sign to the estimated coefficient.
The main result is that in FOMC1 all members make statements of similarly increased
length, but that in FOMC2 less experienced members are particularly inclined to opt
out of debate in the sense that they make significantly fewer interjections and ask fewer
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Table 2: The effect of transparency on count measures of deliberation—meeting level
(a) Economic situation discussion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main Regressors Total Words Statements Questions Sentences Words/Statement
D(Trans) 1,005** -20.1*** -5.62** 67.7*** 42.4***
[0.038] [0.007] [0.044] [0.009] [0.001]
Serving FOMC members 375 -0.22 -0.25 21.9* 1.32
[0.101] [0.944] [0.849] [0.061] [0.824]
D(NBER recession) 487 -13.9 -5.35 5.89 29.8
[0.394] [0.173] [0.271] [0.846] [0.172]
D(2 Day) 720* 20.3** 8.87*** 52.4** -31.7***
[0.079] [0.047] [0.008] [0.022] [0.006]
Uncertainty(t-1) 1.01 -0.052* -0.0086 0.026 0.083**
[0.659] [0.095] [0.438] [0.825] [0.035]
Constant 230 97.0 29.2 -4.22 68.5
[0.955] [0.102] [0.243] [0.984] [0.540]
R-squared 0.314 0.166 0.167 0.344 0.348
Lag Dep. Var? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Meeting Section FOMC1 FOMC1 FOMC1 FOMC1 FOMC1
Sample 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09
Obs 79 79 79 79 79
(b) Policy discussion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main Regressors Total Words Statements Questions Sentences Words/Statement
D(Trans) 283 -51.6*** -16.4*** -12.5 51.8***
[0.672] [0.001] [0.000] [0.715] [0.000]
Serving FOMC members -184 -1.15 -1.35 -8.75 -4.19
[0.543] [0.785] [0.262] [0.545] [0.345]
D(NBER recession) -401 -5.29 -5.04 -28.9 -1.67
[0.703] [0.829] [0.539] [0.628] [0.785]
D(2 Day) 1,632** 8.33 5.77 75.0** 12.7
[0.013] [0.495] [0.165] [0.023] [0.121]
Uncertainty(t-1) -0.27 -0.035 -0.020* -0.014 0.013
[0.914] [0.429] [0.079] [0.909] [0.613]
Constant 9,574* 130 51.5** 498* 125
[0.093] [0.114] [0.027] [0.072] [0.114]
R-squared 0.085 0.179 0.177 0.071 0.468
Lag Dep. Var? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Meeting Section FOMC2 FOMC2 FOMC2 FOMC2 FOMC2
Sample 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09
Obs 79 79 79 79 79
Notes: These tables report the results of estimating (DIFF) on variables related to meeting-
level counts of measures of the discussion. The upper (lower) table reports the results
for FOMC1 (FOMC2). Coefficients are labeled according to significance (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1) while brackets below coefficients report p-values.
28
Table 3: Count measures—member level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main Regressors Total Words Statements Questions Total Words Statements Questions
D(Trans) -1,481 -17.8* -1.78 241*** 3.15 1.62*
[0.384] [0.094] [0.676] [0.009] [0.198] [0.093]
Fed Experience 250 2.61 0.23 464** -6.55 -3.68**
[0.331] [0.106] [0.721] [0.016] [0.137] [0.050]
D(Trans) x Fed Experience -0.54 0.033 0.0052 -2.44 0.13*** 0.047***
[0.761] [0.226] [0.663] [0.359] [0.007] [0.004]
Constant -876 -11.8 -0.11 -5,363** 79.9 44.0**
[0.559] [0.206] [0.976] [0.019] [0.126] [0.048]
Number of groups 38 38 38 38 38 38
Member FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within Meeting FOMC1 FOMC1 FOMC1 FOMC2 FOMC2 FOMC2
Sample 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09
Obs 1449 1449 1449 1432 1432 1432
% Rookie effect - - - - -36.9 -67.5
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating (DinD) on variables related to count
measures of the discussion. Where the difference in difference is statistically significant,
the rookie effect reports, as a % of pre-transparency mean behaviour, the differential effect
of transparency on members with one year of Fed experience compared to a member with
20 years of experience. Coefficients are labeled according to significance (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1) while brackets below coefficients report p-values.
questions.
In order to quantify the economic importance of the estimated effect of career concerns,
whenever the coefficient on the interaction term is significant, we report what we term
the rookie effect. This measures by how much a member with one year of Fed experience
differs in terms of the dependent variable compared to a member with 20 years’ experience,
where the difference is expressed as a percentage of the pre-transparency average for
FOMC members. (The choice of one and 20 years’ experience is driven by the distribution
of experience as presented in figure 1a.) Take for example the significant coefficient of
0.13 in column (5) of table 3. This indicates that each additional year of experience leads
members to make an additional 0.13 statements per meeting during FOMC2. Then a
member with 20 years’ experience will make 19 × 0.13 = 2.47 more statements than a
member in the first year. Moreover, 2.47 represents 36.9% of the pre-transparency mean
number of statements made in FOMC2 by all members. We report the rookie effect as
−36.9 in this case. Similarly, the fall in questions represents a 67.5% decline relative to
the pre-transparency average of questions by members in FOMC2.
The view that emerges is that all members come into the meeting after transparency
with long, scripted statements that they share with their colleagues in FOMC1. Then,
when the time comes to debate policy in FOMC2, inexperienced members stay relatively
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silent and let their more senior colleagues drive the debate.
6.2 Transparency and statement content
As explained in section 5.4, we label each estimated topic as economic or discussion. The
first measure of statement content we construct from the LDA output is the fraction of
time devoted to economics topics. This labeling also allows one to define a conditional
probability distribution over economics topics for FOMC statements. The second mea-
sure of statement content is a Herfindahl concentration index applied to this conditional
distribution. This index measures the scope of the discussion: higher values indicate a
narrow discussion, while lower values indicate a broader discussion.
We again begin the analysis by looking at the meeting-level response of these two
measure to transparency by way of estimating (DIFF). Table 4a contains the results.
There is a marked shift in both FOMC1 and FOMC2 towards more attention towards
economic topics, with a 5.5 and 3.4 percentage point effect in the respective sections.
There is not a measure change in concentration at the aggregate level. Table 4b shows
that these meeting-level results mask heterogeneity at the individual level. First, the
increase in attention to economics topics during the policy discussion is driven more by
inexperienced members. The could either be driven by their engaging less in back and
forth debate—and therefore using less conversational speech patterns—or staying more
focused on substantive issues. The pattern for the topic concentration index moves in
opposite directions during FOMC1 and FOMC2. Inexperienced members come into the
meeting and discuss more topics on average compared to experienced members when
analyzing the economic situation, but when the meeting moves to policy debate inexperi-
enced members limit their attention to fewer topics. This is consistent with inexperienced
members bringing additional information into the meeting in the form of a more diverse
statement in FOMC1, but then not engaging with their colleagues in FOMC2 since such
engagement would force them to touch on viewpoints other than their own.
In order to push the idea that inexperienced members bring additional information to
meetings after transparency, we explore the behavior of the topic that relates to discussion
of quantitative data (topic 7, figure 11a), and also the one that relates to discussion of
staff materials (topic 22, figure 11b). One of the primary ways in which FOMC members
can prepare for meetings is to gather and study data to provide evidence for their views.
Both of these topics indicate introducing such evidence into the discussion—topic 7 is
made up of words that one discussing quantitative data would use, while topic 22 is
made up of words that one engaging with staff briefings and presentations would use.
A member without career concerns who spent little time preparing for meetings (nor
paying attention to colleagues during them) would most likely not discuss their views
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Table 4: Economics focus and concentration of topics discussed
(a) Meeting level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Regressors Economics Economics Herfindahl Herfindahl
D(Trans) 0.055*** 0.034*** 0.00042 -0.0037
[0.000] [0.001] [0.834] [0.101]
Serving FOMC members -0.0018 -0.0055 -0.0012 -0.0016
[0.498] [0.236] [0.153] [0.158]
D(NBER recession) 0.0068 0.014 0.0016 -0.0015
[0.530] [0.461] [0.386] [0.667]
D(2 Day) -0.016** -0.034*** -0.0053*** -0.0054**
[0.013] [0.001] [0.009] [0.017]
Uncertainty(t-1) 9.5e-06 0.000024 -6.4e-06 -0.000017
[0.654] [0.679] [0.478] [0.131]
Constant 0.44*** 0.62*** 0.080*** 0.10***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R-squared 0.764 0.281 0.141 0.125
Lag Dep. Var? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Meeting Section FOMC1 FOMC2 FOMC1 FOMC2
Sample 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09
Obs 79 79 79 79
(b) Member level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Regressors Economics Economics Herfindahl Herfindahl
D(Trans) 1.43*** -0.041 -0.21*** -0.10
[0.003] [0.908] [0.002] [0.323]
Fed Experience -0.22*** 0.0081 0.035*** 0.017
[0.003] [0.878] [0.001] [0.267]
D(Trans) x Fed Experience 0.00021 -0.0014** 0.00071** -0.00037***
[0.622] [0.015] [0.035] [0.000]
Constant 1.86*** 0.56* -0.12* -0.030
[0.000] [0.073] [0.050] [0.737]
Number of groups 38 38 38 38
Member FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within Meeting FOMC1 FOMC2 FOMC1 FOMC2
Sample 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09
Obs 1449 1431 1449 1431
% Rookie effect - 4.7 -13.0 10.4
Notes: The upper table reports the results of estimating (DIFF) and the lower table reports
the results of estimating (DinD) on variables related to LDA measures of the discussion.
Where the difference in difference is statistically significant, the rookie effect reports, as a %
of pre-transparency mean behaviour, the differential effect of transparency on members with
one year of Fed experience compared to a member with 20 years of experience. Coefficients
are labeled according to significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) while brackets below
coefficients report p-values.
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(a) Topic 7—“Data Indicators”
(b) Topic 22—“Staff Material Discussion”
Figure 11: Topics relating to the extent of preparation
Notes: Each word cloud represents the probability distribution of words within a given
topic; the size of the word indicates its probability of occurring within that topic.
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using specific references to relevant data, while one who had done their homework would
likely bring into the meetings a dossier of background information on which to draw.
FOMC1 is the important section for determining the relevance of this effect, since during
it members mainly read from prepared texts.
Tables 5a and 5b present meeting-level and member-level evidence, respectively, on
the allocation of attention to these evidence topics in FOMC1. While there is no meeting-
level change, at the member level we indeed find evidence that rookie members are more
likely to discuss these topics, and especially topic 7, during their analysis of the econ-
omy. Members with one year of experience increase their allocation to topics 7 and 22
relative to those with 20 years’ experience by an amount equivalent to around 44% and
11%, respectively, of the pre-transparency average allocation. There are also changes in
FOMC2, with less overall discussion of topic 7, and relatively more coverage of topic
22 by older members. Since FOMC2 is more extemporaneous than FOMC1, a theory of
greater preparation has no clear prediction on its content, so we simply note these further
empirical results associated with transparency.
Our final measure of content compares the statements of each FOMC member to those
of Alan Greenspan, who is clearly a focal member during the sample. One obvious way
that FOMC members might engage in herding is to mimic the Chair’s views and bring
up similar topics; anti-herding would involve the opposite behavior. Let χi,t,s denote i’s
conditional probability distribution over economics topics in section s of meeting t; we are
interested in comparing the similarity of χi,t,s with χG,t,s, where G is Greenspan’s speaker
index. Although χi,t,s has thirty dimensions, members almost certainly discuss far fewer
topics in each section of each meeting. Hazen (2010) compares several ways of comput-
ing the similarity of documents estimated by LDA, and concludes that the dot product
substantially outperforms other standard measures like cosine similarity and Kullback-
Leibler divergence in conversational speech data when each statement is composed of a
limited number of topics relative to K. Accordingly we define
SGi,t.s = χi,t,s · χG,t,s (3)
as the similarity between member i and Greenspan. If i and G each discuss a single topic,
SGi,t.s is the probability they discuss the same topic. More generally, a higher value of
SGi,t.s indicates a greater overlap in topic coverage.
Table 6 presents the results of estimating DinD with SGi,t.s as the dependent vari-
able. The main result is that after transparency, inexperienced members speak more
like Greenspan in FOMC2—the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction
indicates that the conditional topic distributions of experienced members diverge more
from Greenspan’s; members with a single year of experience become relatively closer to
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Table 5: Discussion topics relating to data indicators
(a) Meeting level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Regressors Data Topic (7) Data Topic (7) Figures Topic (22) Figures Topic (22)
D(Trans) 0.0022 -0.0072*** -0.0044 -0.0031
[0.388] [0.005] [0.255] [0.280]
Serving FOMC members 0.00096 0.00079 -0.0017 -0.00064
[0.416] [0.484] [0.271] [0.558]
D(NBER recession) -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.00093 -0.0028
[0.500] [0.509] [0.747] [0.514]
D(2 Day) -0.0015 0.0026 0.074*** -0.0030
[0.549] [0.194] [0.000] [0.175]
Uncertainty(t-1) -0.000022** -0.000021** -0.000012 1.5e-07
[0.042] [0.012] [0.577] [0.989]
Constant 0.027 0.0043 0.041 0.023
[0.221] [0.826] [0.183] [0.291]
R-squared 0.088 0.262 0.910 0.058
Lag Dep. Var? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Meeting Section FOMC1 FOMC2 FOMC1 FOMC2
Sample 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09
Obs 79 79 79 79
(b) Member level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Regressors Data Topic (7) Data Topic (7) Figures Topic (22) Figures Topic (22)
D(Trans) -0.12 0.020 0.0090 -0.035
[0.239] [0.729] [0.743] [0.267]
Fed Experience 0.019 -0.0038 -0.0011 0.0048
[0.205] [0.675] [0.797] [0.310]
D(Trans) x Fed Experience -0.00065*** -0.000098 -0.000088** 0.00011*
[0.002] [0.103] [0.035] [0.078]
Constant -0.089 0.041 0.017 -0.015
[0.325] [0.431] [0.488] [0.594]
Number of groups 38 38 38 38
Member FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within Meeting FOMC1 FOMC2 FOMC1 FOMC2
Sample 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09
Obs 1449 1431 1449 1431
% Rookie effect 43.9 - 11.7 -14.2
Notes: The upper table reports the results of estimating (DIFF) and the lower table reports
the results of estimating (DinD) on variables related to LDA measures of the discussion.
Where the difference in difference is statistically significant, the rookie effect reports, as a %
of pre-transparency mean behaviour, the differential effect of transparency on members with
one year of Fed experience compared to a member with 20 years of experience. Coefficients
are labeled according to significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) while brackets below
coefficients report p-values.
34
Table 6: Similarity—member level
(1) (2)
Main Regressors SG(it) SG(it)
D(Trans) 0.00085 -0.054*
[0.987] [0.089]
Fed Experience -0.0020 0.0090*
[0.805] [0.067]
D(Trans) x Fed Experience -0.00015 -0.00023***
[0.452] [0.000]
Constant 0.056 -0.0084
[0.223] [0.767]
Number of groups 38 38
Member FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Within Meeting FOMC1 FOMC2
Sample 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09
Obs 1449 1431
% Rookie effect - 9.9
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating (DinD) on LDA derived measures of the
discussion. Where the difference in difference is statistically significant, the rookie effect
reports, as a % of pre-transparency mean behaviour, the differential effect of transparency
on members with one year of Fed experience compared to a member with 20 years of
experience. Coefficients are labeled according to significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1) while brackets below coefficients report p-values.
Greenspan than members with 20 years of experience and the size of the effect is about
10% of the pre-transparency average distance form Greenspan. The lack of effect in
FOMC1 is perhaps to be expected. Greenspan’s main statement in most meetings in
the sample occurred at the beginning of FOMC2. He often spoke very little in FOMC1,
whereas members would have only known his stance unambiguously once they began
speaking in FOMC2. As discussed in section 2, the theoretical predictions of career
concerns models are consistent with both herding and anti-herding. So from a model
testing viewpoint, it is notable that herding appears to be the more relevant effect more
inexperienced members.29
7 Overall Effect of Career Concerns
Ultimately we are interested in linking the effects of transparency to the theoretical frame-
work provided by career concerns models. As discussed in section 2, two key effects of
transparency are an increase in discipline and an increase in conformity/non-conformity.
The results on inexperienced members’ distance from Greenspan together with their
disengaging more during debate in FOMC2 clearly point towards fitting in being more
29Chevalier and Ellison (1999) have drawn the same conclusion from mutual fund managers.
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important than standing out, so we focus on conformity rather than non-conformity.
Table 7: Evidence for career concerns
Discipline Conformity
↑ economics topic coverage in FOMC1 ↓ statements in FOMC2
↑ references to data topics in FOMC1 ↓ questions in FOMC2
↓ distance from Greenspan in FOMC2
↓ economics topic coverage in FOMC2
↑ economics topic percentage in FOMC2
Table 7 categorizes the main difference-in-differences results from the previous section
in terms of their support for discipline or conformity.30 On the one hand, inexperienced
members use the opening part of the meeting (FOMC1) to discuss more economics topics,
and when they do so they refer to quantitative evidence more often. Then in FOMC2
they spend more time discussing economics as opposed to discussion topics. This effect
is ambiguous to classify since it might reflect their talking about less fluff, but also might
reflect less engagement in the discussion. So, we assign this finding to both columns.
On the other hand, support for conformity comes from fewer statements and questions
in FOMC2; sticking to a narrow agenda of economics topics in FOMC2; and increased
mimicry of Greenspan in FOMC2. Of course, ours is not a structural exercise and for
each individual result other interpretations might be possible. Taken as a whole, though,
we argue that the set of facts we have uncovered can be interpreted plausibly and cleanly
through the lens of career concerns.
The effects of discipline and conformity on the informativeness of FOMC members’
expressed views go in opposite directions. With discipline, members spend additional time
gathering information before meetings, which should tend to increase informativeness.
With conformity, members are more likely to avoid expressing their true views, which
should tend to decrease informativeness. The rest of this section seeks to determine
what the overall effect on informativeness is after the shift to transparency by measuring
changes in influence.
7.1 Influence
The basic motivation behind our measurement of influence is the following: as what
member i communicates in his or speech becomes more informative, i’s colleagues should
incorporate i’s topics more in their own speech.
This idea is analogous to the measurement of academic impact. A paper is influential
if it is cited by other influential papers. The potential circularity of this definition is
30In appendix section C we show that the main results are robust to various alternative sample selec-
tions. We also show that the main results do not differ by President / Governor splits. And we carry
out a placebo tests on the transparency change.
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handled by using recursive centrality measures, the most common of which is eigenvector
centrality, which is used in a large number of domains (see Palacios-Huerta and Volij
(2004) for a discussion and an axiomatic foundation). For instance, PageRank, the algo-
rithm for ranking, builds on eigenvector centrality. Recursive impact factor measures are
increasingly common in academia.
In our set-up, the influence measure is built in two steps. First, we construct a matrix
of binary directed measures (how i’s statements relate to j’s future statements). Second,
we use this matrix to compute eigenvector centrality.
For the first step, we use the same similarity measure introduced in section 6 for
measuring similarity to Greenspan. Let Wt be a within-meeting influence matrix with
elements Wt(i, j) = χi,t,FOMC1 · χj,t,FOMC2. In words, we say member i influences j
within a meeting when i’s speaking about a topic in FOMC1 leads to j’s being more
likely to speak about it in FOMC2.
For the second step, use Wt to obtain a Markov matrix W
′
t by way of the column
normalization W′t(i, j) =
Wt∑
jWt(i,j)
. From there, we measure the within-meeting influence
of member i in meeting t as the ith element of the (normalized) eigenvector associated
with the unit eigenvalue of W′t. Denote this value by wit. Loosely speaking, wit measures
the relative contribution of member i’s FOMC1 topics in shaping the topics of all members
in FOMC2. Since Alan Greenspan’s views are potentially dominant for shaping policy,
another quantity of interest is i’s influence just on Greenspan wGit ≡ wit×W′t(i, G), where
G is Greenspan’s speaker index.
Some observers—notably Meyer (2004)—have argued that in fact influence across
meetings is more important than influence within meetings.31 We therefore define an
across-meeting influence matrix At where At(i, j) = χi,t,FOMC2 ·χj,t+1,FOMC2 and arrive
at an overall influence measure ait and a Greenspan-specific influence measure a
G
it in a
manner identical to that described for the within-meeting measures. We focus on the
effect of FOMC2 in meeting t on FOMC2 in meeting t+ 1 since influence on policy is the
main quantity of interest.
Before turning to the diff-in-diff analysis, we provide some statistics on the inter-
meeting influence measures that we calculate. In table 8, we present a ranking of members
by their overall influence (left panel) and their influence on Greenspan (right panel).
31Meyer (2004) writes
So was the FOMC meeting merely a ritual dance? No. I came to see policy decisions
as often evolving over at least a couple of meetings. The seeds were sown at one meeting
and harvested at the next. So I always listened to the discussion intently, because it could
change my mind, even if it could not change my vote at that meeting. Similarly, while
in my remarks to my colleagues it sounded as if I were addressing today’s concerns and
today’s policy decisions, in reality I was often positioning myself, and my peers, for the
next meeting.
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While the table presents the average value of influence for each member, this can be
misleading because the influence measures are relative and so the average depends on
the period during which the member served. We try to control for the meeting-specific
time variation by running a regression of each influence measure in the table on time and
member fixed effects (ait/a
G
it = αit + δt + it). We report, and base the ranking on, the
member-fixed effects from this regression.
This table shows the cross-sectional variation in the influence measures over the entire
tenure of Chairman Greenspan. Members who are highly influential overall tend to
exhibit influence over Chairman Greenspan; the Spearman rank correlation between the
two rankings is 0.76. However, there are some members who exhibit greater influence
over the committee overall than they do over Chairman Greenspan (and vice versa).
Interestingly, while Chairman Greenspan is a very good predictor of what Chairman
Greenspan will subsequently talk about, his successor Ben Bernanke is also measured
to have been influential over what Chairman Greenspan would talk about in the future.
Perhaps surprisingly Chairman Greenspan is found to exhibit little influence over the
overall FOMC. While we leave a deeper investigation of the reasons that some members
are more influential than others for future work, one potential reason for this might be
that members tend to use their statements in FOMC2 to reinforce or dispute the proposed
policy strategy of Chairman Greenspan by talking about different topics to those which he
brought up; because of persistence in what is discussed, this is reflected even in the inter-
meeting influence measures. Moreover, in his role as Chairman, Governor Greenspan may
discuss some topics every meeting which, in many meetings, are not discussed by others
and this would negatively affect his overall influence.
We now turn to the diff-in-diff analysis of influence. Table 9 reports member-level re-
sults on the change in influence associated with transparency.32 Within meetings there is
no overall effect, but the inexperienced have a marginally higher influence over Greenspan.
The results across meetings show a highly significant increase in the influence of the in-
experienced both overall and on Greenspan.
For the ultimate question of interest, the influence results show that what inexperi-
enced members speak about after transparency has a bigger impact on what others (and
specifically the Chairman) speak about in future meetings. The natural explanation is
that what inexperienced members say after transparency is more worth listening to than
before. Another related explanation is that inexperienced members are more likely to
identify important topics before the rest of the committee after transparency. In either
case, the evidence points towards inexperienced members bringing additional information
into deliberation after transparency, even if during that deliberation there is a tendency
to disengage from the ebb and flow of debate that occurred before.
32The results are checked for robustness in appendix section C.
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Table 8: Influence Measures by Member
Meetings under Overall Influence
Speaker Greenspan Fixed Effect Average
Keehn 56 0.0052 0.0641
Forrestal 66 0.0047 0.0599
Guffey 33 0.0041 0.0612
Meyer 43 0.0039 0.0592
Fisher 7 0.0034 0.0583
Mcdonough 79 0.0033 0.0583
Lacker 13 0.0032 0.0576
Minehan 93 0.0029 0.0596
Bernanke 22 0.0028 0.0699
Rivlin 24 0.0027 0.0565
Guynn 80 0.0025 0.0572
Yellen 34 0.0020 0.0559
Broaddus 91 0.0017 0.0564
Johnson 23 0.0017 0.0643
Blinder 13 0.0015 0.0551
Moskow 92 0.0015 0.0562
Poole 64 0.0014 0.0591
Laware 53 0.0013 0.0552
Geithner 18 0.0012 0.0555
Ferguson 67 0.0010 0.0558
Phillips 52 0.0010 0.0548
Hoenig 116 0.0007 0.0552
Syron 41 0.0007 0.0562
Parry 134 0.0002 0.0562
Kelley 114 -0.0001 0.0551
Angell 52 -0.0003 0.0587
Santomero 45 -0.0004 0.0646
Mullins 29 -0.0004 0.0532
Gramlich 62 -0.0004 0.0573
Boykin 28 -0.0007 0.0539
Boehne 100 -0.0007 0.0537
Black 41 -0.0009 0.0555
Pianalto 25 -0.0011 0.0648
Lindsey 41 -0.0015 0.0518
Melzer 83 -0.0017 0.0536
Stern 146 -0.0019 0.0525
Kohn 29 -0.0021 0.0586
Bies 34 -0.0023 0.0612
Hoskins 31 -0.0024 0.0519
Heller 15 -0.0025 0.0658
Mcteer 110 -0.0028 0.0529
Morris 10 -0.0031 0.0514
Olson 34 -0.0031 0.0507
Corrigan 47 -0.0031 0.0527
Seger 29 -0.0034 0.0512
Jordan 86 -0.0036 0.0507
Greenspan 149 -0.0053 0.0539
Stewart 4 -0.0072 0.0433
Meetings under Greenspan Influence
Speaker Greenspan Fixed Effect Average
Bernanke 22 0.00228 0.00854
Greenspan 149 0.00116 0.00515
Keehn 56 0.00077 0.00455
Guffey 33 0.00049 0.00381
Forrestal 66 0.00047 0.00356
Fisher 7 0.00043 0.00354
Minehan 93 0.00036 0.00379
Johnson 23 0.00027 0.00487
Lacker 13 0.00024 0.00328
Laware 53 0.00016 0.00305
Syron 41 0.00009 0.00322
Poole 64 0.00006 0.00369
Rivlin 24 0.00004 0.00299
Blinder 13 0.00004 0.00293
Geithner 18 0.00001 0.00302
Mcdonough 79 0.00001 0.00308
Moskow 92 -0.00001 0.00304
Lindsey 41 -0.00003 0.00282
Yellen 34 -0.00005 0.00290
Meyer 43 -0.00005 0.00305
Santomero 45 -0.00006 0.00526
Mullins 29 -0.00007 0.00280
Guynn 80 -0.00008 0.00296
Black 41 -0.00009 0.00315
Broaddus 91 -0.00010 0.00293
Phillips 52 -0.00011 0.00282
Parry 134 -0.00014 0.00314
Gramlich 62 -0.00015 0.00347
Boykin 28 -0.00016 0.00279
Seger 29 -0.00016 0.00279
Hoenig 116 -0.00016 0.00285
Ferguson 67 -0.00016 0.00289
Kelley 114 -0.00018 0.00291
Angell 52 -0.00018 0.00363
Boehne 100 -0.00019 0.00278
Pianalto 25 -0.00022 0.00570
Stern 146 -0.00025 0.00274
Morris 10 -0.00028 0.00266
Melzer 83 -0.00028 0.00282
Jordan 86 -0.00028 0.00271
Hoskins 31 -0.00030 0.00262
Corrigan 47 -0.00031 0.00284
Olson 34 -0.00038 0.00257
Heller 15 -0.00040 0.00529
Mcteer 110 -0.00041 0.00288
Stewart 4 -0.00049 0.00203
Kohn 29 -0.00064 0.00364
Bies 34 -0.00093 0.00433
Notes: This table reports, for overall FOMC influence (left panel) and influence on Chair-
man Greenspan (right panel), some statistics on the inter-meeting influence measures. The
table presents the average value of influence for each member although the ranking is based
the member-fixed effects from a regression of the influence measure of time and member
fixed effects (ait/a
G
it = αit + δt + it).
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Table 9: Influence—member level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Regressors wit ait w
G
it a
G
it
D(Trans) 0.093** -0.040 0.0039 -0.018***
[0.041] [0.273] [0.507] [0.000]
Fed Experience -0.0093** -0.0041 -0.00036 0.00031
[0.045] [0.284] [0.551] [0.547]
D(Trans) x Fed Experience -0.000023 -0.00010*** -7.2e-06* -0.000027***
[0.593] [0.000] [0.062] [0.000]
Constant 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.0053 0.018***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.133] [0.000]
Number of groups 38 35 38 35
Member FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within Meeting Intra Inter Intra Inter
Sample 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09 87:08-97:09
Obs 1427 1377 1427 1377
% Rookie effect - 3.6 4.5 15.7
Notes: This table reports measures of member influence derived from our LDA estimation.
Where the difference in difference is statistically significant, the rookie effect reports, as a %
of pre-transparency mean behaviour, the differential effect of transparency on members with
one year of Fed experience compared to a member with 20 years of experience. Coefficients
are labeled according to significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) while brackets below
coefficients report p-values.
8 Effect of Transparency on Policy Outcomes
Ultimately, the key macroeconomic question regarding the shift to transparency is what
effect it had on the Federal Funds Rate that the FOMC decides. This section first
shows two pieces of evidence that support the idea that the committee had additional
information after transparency. Of course, regressions of policy outcomes on transparency
can only be done with the (DIFF) specification. We therefore propose an indirect way of
measuring individual influence on policy, and show within the (DinD) specification that
after transparency rookies’ policy influence increases.
8.1 Gradualism changes
One explanation of gradualism, or policy inertia, is that policymakers face uncertainty
and only wish to change policy when they are sufficiently sure they will not have to
quickly reverse their change (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2012). This helps explain why
interest rates can change very quickly in times of crisis (when it is clear that interest rates
need to change). Hence if the FOMC as a whole had more information after transparency,
one possible effect would be reduced gradualism.
To see whether gradualism changed after 1993, we estimate an interest rate reaction
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Table 10: Gradualism before and after transparency
(1) (2) (3)
Main Regressors FFRt FFRt FFRt
Expected inflation -0.15 0.26*** -0.053
[0.496] [0.000] [0.726]
Expected output gap 0.067 0.069** 0.024
[0.193] [0.019] [0.542]
Expected output growth 0.078** 0.085*** 0.100***
[0.044] [0.001] [0.000]
FFR(-1) 1.02*** 0.90*** 1.03***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
D(Transparent) x Expected Inflation 0.32*
[0.056]
D(Transparent) x Expected output gap 0.062
[0.205]
D(Transparent) x Expected real GDP growth -0.024
[0.377]
D(Transparent) x FFR(-1) -0.16*
[0.090]
Constant 0.32 -0.29* -0.20
[0.563] [0.090] [0.238]
R-squared 0.986 0.992 0.991
Frequency Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly
Sample 1987:1-1993:4 1994:1-2006:4 1987:1-2006:4
Obs 28 52 80
Method Prais-Winsten Prais-Winsten Prais-Winsten
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating a gradualism equation using the specifi-
cation and data used in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). We estimate the specification
separately for the pre-transparency period (column (1)), post-transparency period (column
(2)) and a specification which nests both samples allowing for different coefficients pre- and
post- transparency.
function along the lines of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). Their specification allows
for flexible time series structures which allow for persistent shocks. We also employ their
real time data and forecasts from the Greenbook. In table 10, we present the estimates
for pre-transparency (column (1)), post-transparency (column (2)) and a specification
in which we include all data but allow the post-transparency coefficients to vary using
interaction terms. All specifications allow shocks to have become less persistent over
time. Consistent with the committee acting with greater certainty, the results clearly
point to reduced gradualism.
8.2 Monetary Policy Surprises
As a second test, we examine whether the FOMC was more or less likely to surprise the
markets with their interest rate decisions. To do this, we use the surprise data developed
in both Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), which measures the effect of both short
and longer term movements in the yield curve, and Kuttner (2001) (which was subse-
quently used in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)) which captures the shorter end movements
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only. We label these variables “Surprise (GSS)” and “Surprise (K)” respectively. These
data are derived from traded futures securities which allow one to decompose movements
in the Fed Funds target rate into expected and unexpected moves.
Table 11: Effect on market surprises
(1) (2)
Main Regressors |Surprise (GSS)| |Surprise (K)|
D(Trans) 7.83*** 5.36*
[0.002] [0.053]
D(NBER recession) -2.43 -2.08
[0.351] [0.505]
D(2 Day) 0.70 0.76
[0.601] [0.777]
Uncertainty(t-1) 0.0050 0.0052
[0.401] [0.455]
Expected output growth -0.027 0.42
[0.971] [0.616]
Expected inflation 4.00*** 3.23*
[0.006] [0.058]
Expected output gap -0.74 -0.83
[0.139] [0.256]
Constant -11.8** -9.04
[0.034] [0.158]
R-squared 0.156 0.063
Lag Dep. Var? Yes Yes
Sample 89:11-97:09 89:11-97:09
Obs 71 66
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating (DIFF) on the absolute value of FOMC
market surprises measured by Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), Surprise (GSS), and
Kuttner (2001), Surprise (K). Coefficients are labeled according to significance (*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1) while brackets below coefficients report p-values.
In table 11 we report the results of estimating (DIFF) on the absolute value of the
surprise data. The results indicate that there was more (absolute) surprise following
transparency even after controlling for the economic forecast variables such as expected
inflation and the expected output gap. This is especially the case for the broader measures
of surprises (Surprise (GSS)).
8.3 Do rookie members have influence on important topics?
Our final approach to measure an impact on policy builds on what we have already found
and is the only approach where we can analyse the effects as a diff-in-diff analysis. This
approach consists of two stages:
1. We first take the level of the GSS surprise measures used above and identify two
topics that are consistently correlated with surprises during Chairman Greenspan’s
tenure. We report the results in table 12a; controlling for uncertainty and whether
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Table 12: Rookie Policy Influence
(a) Greenspan’s topics and market surprise
(1) (2)
Main Regressors Surprise (GSS) Surprise (GSS)
Demand topic 0.11 0.13*
[0.104] [0.066]
Productivity topic -0.12** -0.14**
[0.019] [0.042]
D(NBER Recession) -0.023 0.0065
[0.331] [0.770]
BBD uncertainty -0.000071 -0.000063
[0.336] [0.363]
Expected output growth 0.0089*
[0.073]
Expected inflation -0.0057
[0.416]
Expected output gap -0.0023
[0.391]
Constant 0.0036 -0.0096
[0.766] [0.755]
R-squared 0.054 0.110
Sample 87:08-06:01 87:08-06:01
Obs 139 139
(b) Influence on Greenspan’s policy topics
(1) (2)
Main Regressors wG∗it a
G∗
it
D(Trans) -0.045 -0.17***
[0.154] [0.000]
Fed Experience 0.0050 0.015***
[0.132] [0.000]
D(Trans) x Fed Experience -0.00011* -0.00017**
[0.065] [0.014]
Constant -0.025 -0.054**
[0.198] [0.027]
Number of groups 38 35
Member FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Within Meeting Intra Inter
Sample 87:08-97:09 89:08-97:09
Obs 1427 1377
% Rookie effect 46.8 76.3
Notes: The upper table reports the results of estimating (DIFF) on the absolute value
of FOMC market surprises measured by Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), Surprise
(GSS), and Kuttner (2001), Surprise (K). The lower table reports the results of estimating
(DinD) on the measures of influence computed only over the two topics shown to correlate
significantly with FOMC surprises of the market. Where the difference in differences is sta-
tistically significant, the rookie effect reports, as a % of pre-transparency mean behaviour,
the differential effect of transparency on members with one year of Fed experience compared
to a member with 20 years of experience. Coefficients are labeled according to significance
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) while brackets below coefficients report p-values.
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the economy is in a recession, we find that topics 23 and 29, introduced in sec-
tion 5.4 and capturing productivity and demand discussions respectively, are both
significantly related to surprises. Specifically, in column (1) we show that when
Chairman Greenspan spends more time discussing demand topics, there tends to
be a positive surprise while productivity discussions are associated with negative
surprises. Column (2) shows that these correlations remain if we additionally con-
trol for Greenbook forecast variables.
2. Next, we ask whether rookies—whose influence on all topics increases after trans-
parency—also increase their influence over Greenspan’s discussion of just these two
topics. This involves recalculating the within- (wGit ) and across-meeting (a
G
it) influ-
ence of Greenspan measures, previously calculated for all economic topics, but now
only looking at topics 23 and 29. These new versions of the influence measures are
wG∗it and a
G∗
it .
Table 12b shows that transparency leads rookie members to increase their influence
of Chairman Greenspan on these topics. The size of the rookie effect indicates
that the effect is substantial relative to the pre-transparency average influence over
Greenspan on these topics.
While this is an indirect test that rookies had higher influence on the federal funds
rate after transparency, we believe that, together with the rest of the findings in this
section, it is certainly consistent with transparency giving rise to an effect on FOMC
decisions via an increased information channel.
9 Conclusions
Overall, we find evidence for the two effects predicted by the career concerns literature:
discipline and information distortion (the latter taking the form of a bias toward confor-
mity). The net outcome of these two effects appears to be positive: rookies become more
influential in shaping discussion and in inducing surprising decisions. We therefore believe
that the evidence available from the 1993 natural experiment points toward an overall
positive role of transparency. However, policymakers—and future research—should ex-
plore ways to structure the deliberation process in order to maximize the discipline effect
and minimize the conformity effect.
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A Sampling Algorithm
Table A.1: Notation
Notation Quantity
Basic Notation
Nd Number of words in document d
D Total number of documents
d Indexes a document
V Total number of unique tokens (Vocabulary)
v Indexes a unique tokens
K Total number of topics
k Indexes a topic
wd,n Word n in document d
zd,n Topic allocation of word n in document d
vd,n Token index of word n in document d
Dirichlet Distributions
βk Term distribution for each topic k
η Dirichlet hyperparameter associated with term distributions
θd Topic distribution for each document d
α Dirichlet hyperparameter associated with topic distributions
Counts
mdk Count of words in document d allocated to topic k
mkv Count of times token v is allocated to topic k
mdk,−n Excluding token n, count of words in document d allocated to topic k
mkv,−(d,n) Excluding token n in document d, count of times unique token v
is allocated to topic k
The basic idea of Gibbs sampling is to sample all variables from their conditional
distributions with respect to the current values of all other variables and the data. In the
LDA model, the data are the words, and the key quantity is the topic allocation of each
word; from the word allocations, one can infer the implied topic and term distributions
quite easily given the imposition of a symmetric Dirichlet prior. As explained in Griffiths
and Steyvers (2004) and in more detail in Heinrich (2009), the conditional distribution
of zd,n, given all other word-topic assignments z−(d,n) and the vector of words w in all
documents, is given by:
Pr
[
zd,n = k
∣∣ z−(d,n),w ] ∝ mkvd,n,−(d,n) + η∑V
v=1(m
k
v,−(d,n) + η)
(
mdk,−n + α
)
(A.1)
The implementation of (collapsed) Gibbs sampling for the LDA model is the following:
1. Randomly assign all words in all documents to a topic in {1, . . . , K}.
2. Form the counts mdk and m
k
v .
3. Iterating through each word in each document:
(a) Drop wd,n from the sample and form the counts m
d
k,−n and m
k
v,−(d,n).
48
(b) Assign a new topic for word wd,n by sampling from (A.1).
(c) Form new counts mdk and m
k
v by adding the new assignment of wd,n to m
d
k,−n
and mkv,−(d,n).
(d) Move on to the next word in the data
4. Repeat 8,000 times.
The estimate of the term distribution matrix (K by V ) after any particular iteration is
given by
β̂vk =
mkv + η∑V
v=1 (m
k
v + η)
(A.2)
and of the topic distribution matrix (D by K) is given by
θ̂kd =
mdk + α∑K
k=1
(
mdk + α
) . (A.3)
A.1 Estimating aggregate document distributions
As explained in the text, we are more interested in the topic distributions at the meeting-
speaker-section level rather than at the individual statement level. Denote by θi,t,s the
topic distribution of the aggregate document. Let wi,t,s,n be the nth word in the document,
zi,t,s,n its topic assignment, vi,t,s,n its token index, m
i,t,s
k the number of words in the docu-
ment assigned to topic k, and mi,t,sk,−n the number of words besides the nth word assigned to
topic k. To re-sample the distribution θi,t,s, for each iteration j ∈ {4050, 4100, . . . , 8000}
of the Gibbs sampler, we33:
1. Form mi,t,sk from the topic assignments of all the words that compose the aggregate
document (i, t, s) from the Gibbs sampling.
2. Drop wi,t,s,n from the sample and form the count m
i,t,s
k,−n.
3. Assign a new topic for word wi,t,s,n by sampling from
Pr
[
zi,t,s,n = k
∣∣ z−(i,t,s,n),wi,t,s ] ∝ β̂vi,t,s,nk (mdk,−n + α) (A.4)
where z−(i,t,s,n) is the vector of topic assignments in document (i, s, t) excluding
word n and wi,t,s is the vector of words in the document.
4. Proceed sequentially through all words.
5. Repeat 20 times.
We then obtain the estimate
θ̂ki,t,s =
mi,t,sk + α∑K
k=1
(
mi,t,sk + α
) . (A.5)
33This procedure is broadly in line with that described in Heinrich (2009) for querying documents
outside the set on which LDA is estimated. The key point is that one can estimate out-of-sample
document distributions that are formed of the same set of topics as the within-sample documents in the
way described. Many fewer iterations are needed since topics do not need to be re-estimated.
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B Estimated Topics
Table B.1: Discussion topics
Topic Top Tokens
T0 side littl see quit better pretti concern good seem much
T4 problem becaus world believ view polit rather make by like
T7 percent year quarter growth first rate fourth half over second
T9 mr without thank laughter let move like peter call object
T14 other may also point first suggest might least indic like
T15 point right want said make agre say comment now realli
T16 now too may all economi seem good much still long
T17 question whether how ask issu rais answer ani know interest
T18 tri can out work way get make how want need
T19 year last month over meet next week two three decemb
T22 year line panel right shown chart by left next middl
T26 up down come out back see off start where look
T27 governor ye vice kelley stern angel parri minehan hoenig no
T32 peopl talk lot say around get thing when all becaus
T33 chang no make reason ani can way other whi becaus
T34 new seem may uncertainti even see much bit by now
T39 look see get seem now when happen realli back regard
T42 get thing problem lot term look realli kind out say
T44 get move can all stage inde signific becaus ani evid
T49 say know someth all can thing anyth happen cannot els
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Table B.2: Economics topics
Topic Top Tokens
T1 price oil increas oilprice effect suppli through up higher demand
T2 target object credibl pricestabil issu goal public achiev strategi lt
T3 direct move support mr recommend prefer asymmetr symmetr favor toward
T5 polici monpol such by action might zero when possibl respons
T6 committe meet releas discuss minut announc vote decis member inform
T8 project expect recent year month data forecast by activ revis
T10 condit committe period reserv futur consist sustain read develop maintain
T11 number data look indic show up measur point evid suggest
T12 statement word languag like use altern sentenc commun refer chang
T13 rate market year spread yield month panel sinc page volatil
T20 model use effect differ rule estim actual result simul relationship
T21 forecast greenbook project assum assumpt staff by baselin scenario path
T23 invest inventori capit incom consum spend busi hous household sector
T24 period reserv market borrow billion day million by treasuri bill
T25 inflat percent core measur level low ue cpi year over
T28 rate market move fund bps ffr polici action point need
T29 product increas wage cost price labor labmkt trend rise acceler
T30 polici might committe may by tighten market eas such seem
T31 district nation manufactur activ region continu area economi employ remain
T35 sale year price industri level continu product auto increas good
T36 rate intrate lt expect real effect lower declin level st
T37 dollar market yen against by intervent mark japanes currenc exrate
T38 bank credit debt loan financi asset by market other also
T40 risk balanc downsid concern view upsid both now side meet
T41 dollar countri export import foreign trade deficit us real other
T43 growth continu economi slow increas strong remain recent expect expans
T45 economi fiscal weak recoveri recess cut confid econom spend budget
T46 treasuri oper secur billion use issu author swap system hold
T47 busi report contact firm compani said up year plan increas
T48 rang money aggreg altern growth nomin monetari veloc year target
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C Robustness analysis
In tables C.1-C.4 below, we explore the robustness of the main diff-in-diff results presented
in section 6 and 7. In each table we report the main diff-in-diff coefficient (φ, on the
“D(Trans) × Fed Experience” regressor) for a number of robustness tests. In particular,
we:
1. Try a number of alternative sample periods;
2. Run a placebo test on the change in transparency;
3. Use a 70-topic model, rather than the 50-topic model used in the baseline;
4. Evaluate whether the effects differ between presidents and governors using a triple-
diff specification.
To evaluate the robustness to different sample sizes, we first follow Meade and Stasav-
age (2008) and exclude 1993 from the estimation entirely but proceed otherwise as in the
baseline sample. The reason for this is that, despite most members claiming (to each
other in a conference call) that they did not know of the transcripts, a few members
certainly knew of them prior to October 1993. Therefore we ignore the whole of 1993 as
this was a period during which FOMC members may have already known of the tran-
scripts and started to adjust their behavior. The second robustness exercise on sample
selection is to remove the first year of Greenspan’s tenure; the behavior of the committee
may have been different in the first meetings as the new Chairman “settled in”. Then
we explore a narrower window of four years before and after the change in transparency.
Finally we include all years of the Greenspan tenure (1987-2006); in this case the sample
is predominantly “post-transparency”.
Table C.1 presents the results for the regressions in section 6 for each of these different
samples. The table shows that the main coefficient of interest is little changed by the
different sample selections. While standard errors do change a bit, the basic messages of
the analysis are robust. Table C.2 presents the results for the regressions in section 7; the
results are even closer across different sample selections when we consider the influence
measures.
We next turn to the other robustness checks. To begin with, we consider a placebo
test on the date of the change in transparency. In particular, we take the second half of
Alan Greenspan’s tenure on the committee, November 1997 to January 2006 (which is
not used in the baseline analysis), and we randomly select November 2001 as the meeting
at which transparency changed. Of course, since transparency did not actually change
at that point, we expect to get zero results on the diff-in-diff with this test and that is
exactly what we get in table C.3 and C.4.
As discussed in section 5.2.2, the information criterion favor a larger number of topics
but we select 50 in the baseline analysis as it combines both parsimony and interpretabil-
ity. But have also carried out the analysis using a 70 topic model. The results, rather
than the 50 topic model used in the baseline analysis. As shown in the third rows of
tables C.3 and C.4, the estimated sign and size of the main coefficients are quite similar
using the larger number of topics (though standard errors are wider for some regressions).
Only the results on the Herfindahl are markedly changed.
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Table C.2: Comparison of results for different sample selections II
D(Trans) × (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fed Experience wit ait w
G
it a
G
it
Baseline Coefficient -0.000023 -0.00010*** -7.2e-06* -0.000027***
[0.593] [0.000] [0.062] [0.000]
Excluding 1993 0.000018 -0.000082*** -3.5e-06 -0.000024***
[0.764] [0.003] [0.484] [0.000]
Dropping Greenspan’s 1st year -0.000023 -0.00011*** -8.7e-06** -0.000027***
[0.609] [0.000] [0.010] [0.000]
Narrow window -0.000020 -0.00011*** -1.0e-05*** -0.000026***
[0.647] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000]
Full Greenspan Tenure -0.000023 -0.00010*** -7.2e-06* -0.000027***
[0.593] [0.000] [0.062] [0.000]
Notes: This table reports, for a variety of robustness tests, the main diff-in-diff coefficient
on the D(Trans)× FedExpi,t regressor. Coefficients are labeled according to significance
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) while brackets below coefficients report p-values.
Finally, we explore whether the effects that we find, which are averages for FOMC
members, are different for further splits of the members into sub-groups. For example, we
can examine whether there is a triple-difference effect such that the diff-in-diff results are
different for Governors and Bank Presidents. We already capture member fixed effects,
so this specification is mostly of interest if we think that rookie presidents and rookie
governors respond in very different ways. The downside of this approach is that, with
more coefficients to estimate, we lose some power in the estimation. The diff-in-diff-in-diff
that we estimate, in the case of Governors versus Presidents, is:34
yit = αi + δt + β1D(Trans)t + η1FedExpi,t + η2FedExpi,t ×D(Pres) . . .
+ β2D(Trans)t ×D(Pres) + φ1D(Trans)t × FedExpi,t . . .
+ φ2D(Trans)t × FedExpi,t ×D(Pres) + it (DinDinD)
From this regression, we can estimate the implied D(Trans)t×FedExpi,t coefficients for
each group separately as φ1 for Governors and φ1 +φ2 for Presidents, with the difference
between these two coefficients given by φ2.
In the final part of tables C.3 and C.4 we report the implied coefficients and the
difference between them for Governors versus Presidents. While some of the triple differ-
ences are statistically significant, for all of the main coefficients that are significant when
we consider the “average” effect, the implied coefficients for each group go in the same
direction as the average effect, and there is not a consistent direction to the difference
between groups. This convinces us that our baseline approach is not missing important
heterogeneity between groups.
34To examine other splits of the members, we could simply replace D(Pres) with a variable splitting
the sample members along another dimension.
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Table C.4: Comparison of results for alternative tests II
D(Trans) × (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fed Experience wit ait w
G
it a
G
it
Baseline Coefficient -0.000023 -0.00010*** -7.2e-06* -0.000027***
[0.593] [0.000] [0.062] [0.000]
Placebo Coefficient 0.000033 0.000022 3.5e-06 2.4e-06
[0.151] [0.518] [0.505] [0.657]
70-topic Model Coefficient -0.000032 -0.000098** -9.2e-06 -0.000027**
[0.475] [0.011] [0.116] [0.015]
Triple-Difference Regressions
Governor Coefficient 0.00007 -0.00002*** 0.00000 -0.00002*
[.339] [.001] [.927] [.065]
President Coefficient -0.00005 -0.00015 -0.00001 -0.00003***
[.604] [.83] [.209] [0]
Difference -0.00013 -0.00014 -7.3e-06 -6.5e-06
Notes: This table reports, for a variety of robustness tests, the main diff-in-diff coefficient
on the D(Trans)× FedExpi,t regressor. Coefficients are labeled according to significance
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) while brackets below coefficients report p-values.
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